Learning in Multi-level Stochastic games with Delayed Information
Distributed decision-makers are modeled as players in a game with two levels. High level decisions concern the game environment and determine the willingness of the players to form a coalition (or group). Low level decisions involve the actions to be implemented within the chosen environment. Coalition and action strategies are determined by probability distributions, which are updated using learning automata schemes. The payoffs are also probabilistic and there is uncertainty in the state vector since information is delayed. The goal is to reach equilibrium in both levels of decision making; the results show the conditions for instability, based on the age of information.
Keywords: Coalitions,delay differential equations,delayed information, distributed decision mak
PS Link: ftp://ftp.u-aizu.ac.jp/ftp/.r/pub/Department/Software/Operating-Systems-Lab/uai.ps.Z
PDF Link: /papers/94/p86-billard.pdf
AUTHOR = "Edward Billard
TITLE = "Learning in Multi-level Stochastic games with Delayed Information",
BOOKTITLE = "Proceedings of the Tenth Conference Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-94)",
PUBLISHER = "Morgan Kaufmann",
ADDRESS = "San Francisco, CA",
YEAR = "1994",
PAGES = "86--93"