Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
First Name   Last Name   Password   Forgot Password   Log in!
    Proceedings   Proceeding details   Article details         Authors         Search    
Designing Informative Securities
Yiling Chen, Mike Ruberry, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Abstract:
We create a formal framework for the design of informative securities in prediction markets. These securities allow a market organizer to infer the likelihood of events of interest as well as if he knew all of the traders' private signals. We consider the design of markets that are always informative, markets that are informative for a particular signal structure of the participants, and informative markets constructed from a restricted selection of securities. We find that to achieve informativeness, it can be necessary to allow participants to express information that may not be directly of interest to the market organizer, and that understanding the participants' signal structure is important for designing informative prediction markets.
Keywords:
Pages: 185-195
PS Link:
PDF Link: /papers/12/p185-chen.pdf
BibTex:
@INPROCEEDINGS{Chen12,
AUTHOR = "Yiling Chen and Mike Ruberry and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan",
TITLE = "Designing Informative Securities",
BOOKTITLE = "Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Conference Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-12)",
PUBLISHER = "AUAI Press",
ADDRESS = "Corvallis, Oregon",
YEAR = "2012",
PAGES = "185--195"
}


hosted by DSL   •   site info   •   help